Irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options have led to significant advances many areas. We broaden this range of applications, showing how the techniques can apply to many policy problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade policy. With small changes, standard techniques can handle a wide range of strategic problems related to policy. The decision to commit is like the decision to make an irreversible investment. Explicitly considering and correctly valuing the option to wait makes discretion relatively more attractive, implies that greater uncertainty increases the gain to discretion and results in policy that displays hysteresis.
I. Introduction
Irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options have led to significant advances in capital budgeting, environmental economics, and industrial organization. We wish to broaden this range of applications further, showing how the techniques can apply to many game theoretic problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade policy. We show how, with small changes, standard techniques can handle a wide range of strategic problems related to policy.
More specifically, we consider problems of commitment. The decision to commit is like the decision to make an irreversible investment. The previous literature on commitment considers a once-and-for-all choice between rules and discretion, and does not allow future agents to adopt rules. If the option to wait indeed has positive value--as such options often do--it adds to the desirability of discretion. Furthermore, because no policymaker can bind itself forever, we extend the analysis to consider entry and exit; not from production, but from commitment to a policy rule.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses a variety of models that fit the general framework we propose. It looks at the static games that section III embeds in continuous time. We choose games where commitment is sometimes useful, that is , where the standard NCE (noncooperative equilibrium, or Nash-Cournot equilibrium) leads to a Pareto inferior outcome. Section III provides a very general way of thinking about policy, allowing costly commitment with costly reversal. Continuous time highlights the analogy with irreversible investment problems, as well as simplifying the model. We illustrate how decisions to commit or renege depend on the cost of doing so and on uncertainty in the environment.
In section IV, we conclude by emphasizing three general results. First, the option to wait, which we have restored to the policymaker's decision problem, makes commitment less attractive and also implies that increased uncertainty makes commitment even less so. This is the "bad news principle" of irreversible investment applied in a policy context. Second, by allowing the commitment decision to take place in "real time," we note that the policy choice process displays hysteresis; the policy in force at a given time depends on history, not just the prevailing state. Third, we show that the ability to switch regimes means that small changes in the underlying state can induce large changes in the relevant expectations; consequently, variables sensitive to expectations (such as asset prices) can move quickly and asymmetrically, showing a decided nonlinearity.
II. Preliminary Examples
In this section, we present several concrete examples in which commitment matters and regret is possible. We begin with one from bank regulation. The banking focus also shows how to use irreversibility for policy rather than investment decisions (see Pindyck [1991] or McDonald and Siegel [1986] ).
Bank Regulation
Consider the following game between a regulator and a bank (or the banking system). The regulator may choose to be either tough (T) or weak (W). Tough regulators do not bail out insolvent banks; weak regulators do. A bank chooses to be safe (S) or risky (R). If banks are truly safe, the regulator prefers to relax his vigilance, take it easy, and be weak. If banks are risky, the regulator prefers to be tough. If the regulator is tough, banks have an incentive to stay safe, but if the regulator is weak, they would rather choose risky. The strategic form of the game then looks like (G0).
(G0) Payoffs for Game between Regulator and Banks
Banks
Safe Risky
(See Mailath and Mester [1994] or Kane [1989] for more sophisticated approaches to closure policy, which do not, however, address the dynamic commitment problem.) The NCE is (Weak, Risky) but both parties would prefer (Tough, Safe The notion behind this game is that tough regulators will not bail out an insolvent bank, leading the banks to undertake safe investments that make bail-outs unnecessary. A weak regulator will bail out the banks, and so banks choose the more profitable risky investment; some fail, and the regulator must bail them out.
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Those familiar with game theory may notice that this is a game in which the Row player has staying power. In the standard classification of the 78 distinct bimatrix games, it is Brams Number 68. A similar game, Brams Number 63, would suit our purposes as well. See Brams (1983) . Now lets complicate the example by bringing in the possibility of regret. So far, the regulator is always happy about committing to be tough. Suppose, however, that in some states of the world, the regulator regrets this. In good states, we prefer a tough regulator who eliminates the costly wealth transfers from taxpayers to bank investors, but in bad states, we prefer the weak regulator. Perhaps in the bad state (say a recession), systemic risk means that being tough leads to a financial panic.
(G1) Payoff Functions for Game between Regulator and Banks
Banks
For small values of u, this game has the same equilibrium as (G0), to which it reduces when u is zero. This game has a Prisoners Dilemma flavor about it for small values of u, in that both parties would very much prefer the Tough, Safe payoff. For large shocks to the economy, however (that is, for large u), the Weak, Risky equilibrium becomes preferable--perhaps reflecting that in a systemic crisis, we need to bail out the banks, even if that means they make riskier investments. 3 In this case, the regulator would regret any commitment to a fixed rule of being tough.
In the next section, we derive the optimal policy when u follows a more general process and when the regulator has a cost of committing and a cost of reneging on that commitment, but some central insights arise if we consider a simple two-state example, with u =0 or u=6.
Because the policy decision takes place in real time, we have two cases to consider. Either the economy starts out in the good state, or it starts out in the bad state.
Suppose it starts out in the good state. If the regulator is weak, he gets a payoff of -8 today and chooses whether to be weak again or tough next period. If the regulator is tough, he gets a payoff of 0 today and remains tough forever, as the only way to be tough is to commit forever. This immediately shows where the option value enters: By being weak today, the regulator retains the option to commit tomorrow, and this option has value. The analogy with irreversible investment is direct.
The standard time-consistency literature, however, considers rules versus discretion as a once-and-for-all choice. Unless the regulator commits to rules at the beginning of time, the suboptimal or "weak" choice is made in each period. Making such a decision forever seems simple-minded in this simple model, yet it is analogous to the restriction implied by posing the rules-versus-discretion question in the standard way.
Drawing the analogy to investment under uncertainty highlights a flaw in the standard approach.
A striking consequence of the option value--the bad news principle--also arises in this example. We suspect this principle lies behind a tendency that is conspicuous in the arguments over rules versus discretion. The rhetoric advocating discretion accentuates the negative possibilities--the downside, the worst outcomes--of rules.
In this example, the bad news principle arises because the regulator sometimes regrets the commitment to be tough. The regulator never regrets an initial decision to be weak, since it can later commit to be tough. Increasing the payoff to toughness does not affect the relative payoffs--and thus the choice--today. This illustrates the principle that only news about bad outcomes affects the choice between rules and discretion.
The above formulation differs from the standard approach in a more subtle way, necessary, but not sufficient, for irreversibility. The standard approach makes a timeless comparison before the state of the economy is fully known. By contrast, in this paper the government operates in "real time" and knows the current state of the economy, just as in the irreversible investment literature the investor knows today's rate of return. Again, this twist follows naturally from the investment analogy.
Continuing the example shows how the standard timeless comparison can lead to the wrong conclusion by ignoring information the government can use. The standard approach gives the regulator two strategies: Either commit to Tough or allow discretion, which in our simple example amounts to playing Weak forever. In Haubrich and Ritter (1996) , we analyze commitment to monetary rules in the traditional time inconsistency setup (Barro and Gordon, [1983] ). A third monetary policy application derives from observations about the fragility of fixed-exchange-rate regimes.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) lay out the following case: (1) Maintaining a fixed exchange rate is technically feasible for almost any country; (2) under normal circumstances, countries gain (or think they gain) from fixing their exchange rate; but (3) the collateral damage caused by an attempt to defend the peg, when threatened by a terms-of-trade shift or some other shock, means the government's commitment to its rate may not be credible. Thus, even the strongest legal commitments to fixed exchange rates--currency boards, for example--will not always succeed (Zarazaga [1995] ). Nevertheless, despite compelling arguments that they will ultimately fail, countries continue to adopt fixedexchange-rate policies. We describe a framework that can provide a positive theory of the switches between policy regimes.
Trade Policy
Some insight into the dynamics of trade agreements might be gained from (G3 High 9-u 2 , -2 0,0
As mentioned before, the payoff structure of examples (G1) , (G2), and (G3) has more general applications. The tractability of the quadratic model makes it a natural approximation for many commitment problems (and for many other economic problems.
Thus, we could illustrate our main point with such additional examples as adhering to the Gold Standard (with regret in a war or depression), granting patents for the exclusive use of new technology (with regret in cases like AZT), or allowing constitutions to bind future legislatures.
In fact, the tractability constraint does not bind us exclusively to quadratic payoffs. From our perspective, the more binding constraint in the continuous time models was the need to posit an essentially static underlying game. We conjecture that, with sufficient mathematical expertise, this need not be a binding constraint either.
III. Entering and Exiting Commitment
Mechanisms to commit irrevocably are almost impossible to imagine. It is not difficult, however, to cite examples of mechanisms that make it costly for a firm or a government to alter its policy. A constitutional amendment, for example, is difficult to pass and to remove. Ordinary legislation has lower costs at both ends. For a firm, the corporate charter, financial agreements, and strategic plans play a similar role.
Institutions can effectively tie their hands loosely or tightly, being able to escape if they are willing to bear the appropriate level of pain. For any particular decision, these costs can usually be considered as given: passing a law, amending the constitution, issuing a regulation. In future work, we hope to make the choice of commitment mechanism endogenous.
We maintain the traditional semantics of commitment and discretion, but wish to highlight a bias in tone that colors the discussion when commitment is not irrevocable.
We are forced to use words (like renege and weasel) having clear negative connotations that we regard as unfortunate. We interpret the results of this section as a model of optimal behavior and tolerate the terminology only to fit our paper into the literature on rules and discretion.
A world in which policymakers can, at a cost, enter and exit commitment (or, more generally, any policy regime) closely resembles Dixit's (1989a) model of the entry and exit problem faced by competitive firms.
While a discrete time approach can sometimes handle particular versions of the problems (as Lambson [1992] does for entry-exit decisions), 5 the continuous time approach set out in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) generally proves more convenient. A generic quadratic payoff model captures the main points in a context that is simple yet general.
A Quadratic Model
We implement these ideas in continuous time as follows: The policy authority (the Fed, for example) will be following either rules or discretion. The payoff from discretion, which depends on the state of the economy u, is
The payoff from rules is (2) P u r r u r u R ( ) .
Following examples (G1) and (G2), and by analogy with the previous sections, we assume that rules tend to be preferred when the shock is small, so that for small u,
We assume that u follows a simple Ito process
where a describes the drift of the process and s denotes its standard deviation, with dz describing a white-noise Wiener process.
The optimal policy switches between the two quadratic payoff functions with cost C of committing to rules, that is, of moving from discretion to rules, and cost W (for weaseling) of moving from rules to discretion. 6 To solve this, we employ the general methods of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Our problem maps most naturally into an entry and exit problem. Unlike the problem for firms, where uncertainty over prices is best modeled by geometric Brownian motion, for many problems two-sided shocks are more natural and therefore are best modeled with Brownian motion, which may turn negative.
Weather, oil price shocks, trade flows, and interest rate shifts may all take positive or negative values. Consequently, where Dixit and Pindycks problem has two boundaries, one price at which the firm enters the market and another price at which the firm exits, our problem has four boundaries: two above zero and two below zero.
In what follows, we derive the differential equations for the value functions, and derive the smooth pasting and value matching conditions necessary for the optimum of this stochastic control problem. The conditions give us the necessary equations to solve numerically for the boundaries between the rules region and the discretion region. Full details can be found in the appendix.
In the interior of the discretion region, the value function for the problem obeys
We apply Itos Lemma to find the differential equation for the value function
A similar argument for the interior of the rules region yields the following, in which subscripts denote partial derivatives:
continuous time. We examine it in a companion paper (Haubrich and Ritter [1995] ). 6 Allowing weaseling adds a component similar to the escape clause models of Flood and Isard (1988) and Lohman (1992) , who consider a cost to renege. In one sense, we generalize those models by allowing a The particular solution S u D ( ) turns out to be the value of discretion forever, so that the two exponential terms are the value of the option to commit. (See also Dixit and Pindyck [1994, chapter 6, section 2] .) For very large shocks u approaching infinity, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that the regulator will ever commit (recall that it prefers discretion for large shocks), and so the value of that option approaches zero. This means the term with the positive exponent, β 1 , must vanish for large u, implying that A h 1 must be zero.
This leads to the simplified expression for the value function in the high (positive) discretion region:
positive cost of recommitment and allowing delay in recommitment. In another sense, those models are more general, in that they allow more general state-contingent rules. We prefer to focus on the dynamics. 7 The particular solution is all that would change if we used a form of costs other than quadratic.
After employing a similar argument for the lower (negative) discretion region, we have
Four boundaries define the regions. Two boundaries determine when the regulator weasels out of rules and adopts discretion, one at the upper boundary u W and one at the lower boundary u W . The other two boundaries determine when a discretionary regulator commits to rules, entering the commitment region from above, u C , or from below, u C .
With the general form of the value function in hand, we can find the boundary values by imposing the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. For example, at the upper commitment boundary, the value of continuing in discretion just equals the value of adopting rules and paying the cost to commit:
Likewise, the smooth pasting conditions impose equality on the derivatives of the value functions:
This is repeated for each boundary, producing eight equations (one value matching and one smooth pasting condition for each boundary) in eight unknowns (four boundaries and four undetermined coefficients). The appendix sets out these equations and proves the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
Numerical Solution and Comparative Statics
As frequently happens in the stochastic control literature, closed-form solutions do not seem to exist for this problem, and we resort to numerical methods. Gauss NLSYS was able to solve the eight simultaneous equations, though convergence Quite apparently, then, it is incorrect to judge policy simply on the current state of the economy, and particularly inappropriate to naively contrast current policy with past policies at a similar state of the economy or stage of the business cycle. In a word, our model predicts policy hysteresis. This shifting reemphasizes a point stressed by Flood and Garber (1984) in their work on the gold standard: To evaluate a policy rule, one must analyze the entire dynamic policy sequence, including periods where discretion reigns.
Implicit in the hysteresis is something so obvious that it might escape notice--that the policymaker switches from rules to discretion, and from discretion to rules, over time.
Regimes shift. Discretion, commitment, and weaseling out of commitment will all occur. Another prominent feature is that the weasel boundary is farther out than the commit boundary. Were there no cost of switching between regimes, the boundaries would be the same, at
, where the expected gain from continuing discretion just matches the expected gain from using rules. 8 Adding a commitment cost drives a wedge between the two value functions and requires that the regulator gain even more from rules. This means moving the boundary farther into the area where rules are preferred, that is, closer to zero. Similarly, a cost to backing out of rules means shifting the boundary even farther into the area where discretion is preferred, that is, away from zero. Hence the weasel boundary is farther out than the commit boundary. Figure 2 shows that the greater the cost of commitment, the less likely the regulator is to commit. As the cost increases, the relative benefits of rules over discretion must also increase, and so the commitment boundary shrinks towards zero. For a high enough cost, commitment never occurs.
One other more practical advantage of the continuous-time formulation lies in its ability to allow easy exploration of a broad range of questions, like changes in entry and exit costs and variability of shocks. 
Expected Time in Regime
Since we propose a model with discrete regime shifts, how long the current policy regime is expected to last is critical in applications like asset pricing, where agents must look into the future. For example, monetary policy conducted under discretion may result in a higher inflation rate than policy conducted under rules. Most bond traders--and academics studying the term structure of interest rates--concede the influence of monetary policy. Most would also concede frustration in understanding that influence.
At times modest increases in the federal funds rate lead to sharp increases in long rates; at other times modest changes provoke modest changes. 9 Thinking about policymakers as entering and exiting commitment, with its associated nonlinearities and hysteresis, can shed some light--and one day may even yield some quantitative evidence--on the matter.
To obtain an idea of how the expected time in a regime behaves, we set up the following simulation. We let the underlying shock follow Brownian motion with a variance of 0.1. We sampled this process 120 times at monthly intervals, assuming commitment boundaries of +2 and -2 and weasel boundaries of +3 and -3. This was meant to capture the idea that the policymaker periodically, but not continually, reviews policy based on the indicators of the underlying economy. For a given starting point, we generated 1,000 runs of the Brownian motion path, keeping track (by month) of when the path was in the rules and the discretion region (which is obviously path dependent).
Averaging over the 1,000 runs gives an estimate of the expected fraction of time spent in each region over the next 10 years. Figure 5 reports the results. The X-axis shows the starting value for the simulation, and the Y-axis shows the fraction of time spent in discretion. For example, if the current value of the underlying shock is 1.5, the expected fraction of time in discretion is only 0.04 ( or 4.8 months out of 10 years). In other words, the amount of time expected to be spent in discretion over the next 10 years is trivial, given a starting point this far into the rules region. The figure reports two numbers for starting values between 2 and 3, depending on whether the starting value is assumed to be in the rules or the discretion region.
If, as mentioned above, the discretion regime results in a higher inflation rate, the data shown in figure 5 can easily be translated into a numerical inflation premium. Say that rules produce zero inflation and discretion produces constant inflation of 10 percent.
Then the average expected inflation over the next 10 years is 0.4 percent when the underlying state is 1.5, but it rises rapidly thereafter. These results imply that inflationary expectations--and thus long-term interest rates--can change dramatically without a shift in policy, as people anticipate that a new policy regime is more likely. These shifts depend sensitively on the underlying state of the economy and on the current policy regime. 
Conclusion
For low-u discretion we need A 21 = 0. Otherwise, the value option to commit explodes as we get farther in the negative direction from the point at which we would want to commit.
So, in the low-u discretion region, we have equation (5) of the paper:
The rules region is bounded, so neither option term drops out, and the solution is equation (3) of the paper:
The value function must also satisfy the following value-matching and smoothpasting conditions:
We have eight equations and eight unknowns: A 1l , A 2h , B 1 , B 2 , uc , u c , u w , and u w .
Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions
To establish the existence and uniqueness of the solution, we use a variation on the approach used by Dixit (1989b, unpublished appendix) .
Preliminaries
First, we define two functions that measure the difference between the value functions (analogues of Dixits G(P) function) for the upper and lower boundary pairs: Next, we need to establish that Q(u) is convex. Convexity follows from our assumption that the rules loss function is more convex than the discretion loss function and from the formulae for S R and S D . Increase D 2 2 to make H 2 tangent to -C. This will be a local minimum. Notice that this puts H 2 above H 1 at the point where H 1 is tangent to +W. Since Q is convex, the LHS is a decreasing line. The RHS is downward-sloping, convex to the left, and concave to the right --like a cotangent function. Obviously, there will be no more than three solutions. Û Given the shape of H--that is, lim (
H u H u →−∞ →+∞ = +∞ = −∞ (again see figure A1 )--solutions to H¢(u)=0 come in pairs. Thus, have more than one minimum and one maximum, we would need at least four solutions to H¢ = 0. But the lemma shows that we can have at most three, and since we have already proven existence, we know that exactly two solutions exist, a unique maximum and a unique minimum. This implies that 
Given our hypothesis that Γ Γ 
